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OUTPUT EFFECTS OF INFLATION WITH FIXED 





With fixed costs of price and quantity adjustment, output effects of inflation depend on the 
elasticity of the firm’s marginal real revenue. If the elasticity always exceeds minus unity, 
then output decreases with inflation, while if the elasticity is always less than minus unity, 
then output increases with inflation. In the special case that the elasticity always equals minus 
unity, then output is independent of inflation. This is the case if demand is derived from a log-
quadratic utility function. 
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There is convincing evidence that ﬁxed costs of price adjustment may be large. Thus, Levy
et al. (1997) and Zbaracki et al. (2004) ﬁnd the cost to be 0.7% and 1.22% of a ﬁrm’s
revenue, respectively. In the presence of ﬁxed costs of price adjustment, a monopolistic ﬁrm
does not adjust its nominal price continuously, with the result that the real price and output
generally deviate from their static monopoly level. At low inﬂation rates, the average output
is higher than the static monopoly output if there is positive discounting (Danziger, 1988),
and depends on higher order derivatives of the proﬁt and demand functions if there is no
discounting (Benabou and Konieczny, 1994).1
Most of the literature assume that only price adjustments are costly, while output can
be continuously adjusted. However, Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) document that there may
be very large ﬁxed costs of adjusting quantities, and many papers show that adjusting labor
and capital inputs involves signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs.2 Such costs may derive from the loss of
organizational capital (Baily et al., 2001 and Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001), as well as from
job protection rules, severance pay, and legal and administrative complications.
In a framework with both price- and quantity-adjustment costs, Andersen (1995) and
Andersen and Toulemonde (2004) demonstrate that only intermediate-size shocks — but not
large or small shocks — may aﬀe c to u t p u t . F o rac o n s t a n ti n ﬂation rate, Danziger (2001)
shows that a ﬁrm’s permanent production decreases with inﬂation at low inﬂation rates if
discounting is positive, and Danziger and Kreiner (2002) that output capacity decreases with
inﬂation if the elasticity of demand is constant and there is no discounting.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple general characterization of the output
eﬀects of a constant inﬂation rate if both price and quantity adjustments involve ﬁxed costs.
It is assumed that quantity adjustments are at least as costly as price adjustments, which
1 See also Rotemberg (1983), Kuran (1986), Naish (1986), Benabou (1988), and Konieczny (1990).
2 For the cost of adjusting labor, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Hamermesh (1989), Caballero et al.
(1997), and Abowd and Kramarz (2003). For the cost of adjusting capital, see Doms and Dunne (1998),
Cooper et al. (1999), and Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003).
1implies that production is kept constant at a permanent level.3 The ﬁrm keeps its nominal
price unchanged in periods of equal length, and adjusts the nominal price so that the initial
real price is the same in each period. Thus, the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy consists of the initial
real price, the duration of the periods with unchanged nominal price, and the permanent
level of production. It is proved that, in the absence of discounting, the eﬀect of inﬂation
on the permanent production is fully determined by the elasticity of the ﬁrm’s marginal real
revenue: output decreases with inﬂation if the elasticity is always greater than minus unity,
increases with inﬂation if the elasticity is always less than minus unity, and is unaﬀected
by inﬂation if the elasticity is always equal to minus unity. The latter occurs if demand is
derived from a log-quadratic utility function.
The explanation for this is that the ﬁrm can only sell part of the permanent production
at the beginning of a period when the real price is high, but all of it at the end of a period
when the real price is low. A higher inﬂation rate is associated with a higher real price,
and hence lower sales, at the beginning of a period, as well as with a lower real price at
the end of the period, when the ﬁrm anyway sells all it produces. The smaller the marginal
real revenue at the initial real price, the less pronounced is the negative eﬀect on the real
revenue of lower sales at the beginning of the period; accordingly, for a given inﬂation-
induced increase in the real price at the beginning of a period, the smaller is the absolute
value of the inﬂation-induced decrease in the real price at the end of a period, which tends
to decrease the permanent production.
Additionally, a higher real price at the beginning of a period and a lower real price at
the end of the period imply a smaller average marginal real revenue in the period. Hence, a
smaller loss of average marginal real revenue from an increase in the initial real price relative
to the loss of average marginal real revenue from a decrease in the terminal real price, also
leads to a smaller absolute value of the decrease of the real price at the end of the period
for a given increase in the real price at the beginning of a period, which further tends to
3 See Danziger (2001). Production clearly reacts to shocks and may even vary more than prices over the
business cycle. However, the present model does not include shocks, the focus being on a fully anticipated,
constant rate of inﬂation.
2decrease the permanent production.
The eﬀect of inﬂation on output therefore depends on how fast the marginal real revenue
decreases with demand. As shown in the paper, if the marginal real revenue is less than
inversely proportional to demand, in which caset h ee l a s t i c i t yo ft h em a r g i n a lr e a lr e v e n u e
always exceeds minus unity, then output decreases with inﬂation. Conversely, if the marginal
real revenue is more than inversely proportional to demand, in which case the elasticity of the
marginal real revenue is always less than minus unity, then output increases with inﬂation.
If the marginal real revenue is inversely proportional to demand, so that the elasticity of the
marginal real revenue always equals minus unity, then output is invariant to inﬂation.
Several recent studies have found that the co-movement between output and prices is
typically negative in the long run (Kydland and Prescott, 1990; Cooley and Ohanian, 1991;
Fiorito and Kollintzas, 1994; Den Haan, 2000; and Den Haan and Summer, 2004). Within the
framework of the present model, this indicates that the empirically relevant case is that the
elasticity of the marginal real revenue always exceeds minus unity.4 This is satisﬁed, among
others, by the important class of demand functions exhibiting a constant price elasticity less
than minus unity.
2 The Model
Consider a monopolistic ﬁrm producing a single perishable. The stationary demand function
is D(zt), where zt denotes the real price at time t,a n dztD0(zt)/D(zt) < −1.
The inﬂation rate is a constant µ>0. The ﬁrm sets its output and nominal price, and
adjusting either involves a ﬁxed cost. Quantity adjustments are at least as expensive as price
adjustments, so the ﬁrm keeps its output constant at a permanent level, while adjusting the
4 While this paper analyzes the output behavior of a single ﬁrm, the empirical ﬁndings refer to the aggre-
gate output of all ﬁrms. However, with similar assumptions as in Danziger (2001), the partial-equilibrium
framework can be embedded in a general-equilibrium model with a continuum of ﬁrms producing diﬀerenti-
ated goods and facing demand functions that depend on only the real price charged for the ﬁrm’s good. The
aggregate production in the economy will then depend on the inﬂation rate in the same way as the output
of a single ﬁrm studied in this paper. See also Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) who study the output
consequences of monetary shocks in a model with staggered price setting.
3nominal price at equally spaced intervals. The initial real price is the same in all periods
with unchanged nominal price.
Let Y denote the permanent production and C(Y ), C0(Y ) > 0, the real cost of produc-
tion. The real price at which demand equals production is zY ≡ D−1(Y ). At higher real
prices, the ﬁrm sells less than it produces, while at lower real prices, the ﬁrm could sell more
than it produces. The ﬁrm’s instantaneous real proﬁt from production at time t is

   
   
ztD(zt) − C(Y )i fzt ≥ zY,
ztY − C(Y )i f zt <z Y.
If S is the initial real price in a period with a constant nominal price, then zτ = Se−µτ is
the real price after τ of the period has elapsed, and TY ≡ (1/µ)ln(S/zY) is the time taken
for the real price to decrease zY.I ti sa s s u m e dt h a t0<T Y <T,w h e r eT is the duration of
the period. If c is the ﬁxed real cost of a price adjustment incurred at the beginning of the
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The ﬁrst integral is the total real revenue when the ﬁrm sells less than it produces, and
the second integral is the total real revenue when the ﬁrm sells everything it produces.
There is no discounting, and the ﬁrm chooses S, T,a n dY to maximize the average real







































where s ≡ Se−µT i st h et e r m i n a lr e a lp r i c e .
4These can be rewritten as5
SD(S) − sY =0 , (1)







0(Y )=0 . (3)
Condition (1) shows that the initial and terminal real revenues are equal, or equivalently,
that the initial and terminal real proﬁts from production are equal. Condition (2) shows that
the terminal real proﬁt from production equals the average real proﬁt( w h i c ht a k e st h eﬁxed
cost of price adjustment into account). Condition (3) shows that the average marginal real
revenue equals the marginal real cost. It is assumed that conditions (1)-(3) yield a unique
maximum and that the average real proﬁt is positive.
3I n ﬂation and Permanent Production
To determine how the permanent production varies with the inﬂation rate, conditions (1)-(3)
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5is the marginal real revenue at the initial real price.
Since the denominator of dY/dµ is positive from the second-order condition, dY/dµ has
the same sign as
φD(S) − C
0(Y )Y. (4)
To understand this result, note that as the inﬂation rate increases, the initial real price
increases and the terminal real price decreases. The ﬁrm sells less than it produces when real
prices are high, but all it produces when real prices are low, so a higher S reduces output,
while a lower s increases output. Hence, the overall eﬀect of inﬂa t i o no nt h ep e r m a n e n t
production depends on whether the output response of the higher S or the lower s dominates.
The smaller the marginal real revenue at the initial real price, the less the real revenue
at the beginning of a period with a constant nominal price increases in D(S); the lower is
therefore the loss of initial real revenue from an increase in S relative to the loss of terminal
real revenue from a decrease in s. Accordingly, the smaller the marginal real revenue at the
initial real price, the less s decreases for a given increase in S, which tends to make Y a
decreasing function of inﬂation.
T h ei n c r e a s ei nS and the decrease in s reduce not only the initial and terminal real
revenues, however, but also the average marginal revenue in a period. Since a smaller loss
of average marginal real revenue from an increase in S relative to the loss from a decrease
in s also causes a smaller decrease in s for a given increase in S, this too tends to make Y
an decreasing function of inﬂation.
Speciﬁcally, expression (4) shows that Y decreases with inﬂation if the marginal real
revenue decreases suﬃciently slowly with demand that φD(S) is an increasing function
of D(S). Put diﬀerently, Y decreases with inﬂation if the marginal real revenue always
changes less than inversely proportional with demand, or equivalently, if the elasticity of the
marginal real revenue always exceeds minus unity. Conversely, Y increases with inﬂation if
the marginal real revenue decreases suﬃciently fast with demand that φD(S) is a decreasing
function of D(S); that is, if the marginal real revenue always changes more than inversely
proportional with demand, or equivalently, if the elasticity of the real revenue is always
6less than minus unity. Finally, Y is constant and equal to the static monopoly output for
all inﬂation rates if the marginal real revenue is inversely proportional to demand, making
φD(S) constant; this occurs if the elasticity of the real revenue always equals minus unity.
4A n E x a m p l e
In this example, depending on the value of a constant, the permanent production either
decreases with inﬂation, increases with inﬂation, or is independent of inﬂation.





where α > 0a n dγ <C 0(0), β any real number, and zt ≤ αeβ/α−1.6 The marginal real
revenue is α/D(zt)+γ, and its elasticity −1/[1+γD(zt)/α]. Thus, the marginal real revenue
is inversely proportional to demand if γ = 0. Furthermore, since the demand curve moves
up with γ without changing its slope, the marginal real revenue, and hence also its elasticity,
for a given real price increases with γ.
If γ > 0, the elasticity of the marginal real revenue always exceeds minus unity: the
permanent production decreases with inﬂation and is always less than the static monopoly
output.7 If γ < 0 ,t h eo p p o s i t ei st h ec a s e . I fγ = 0, in which case the inverse demand
function reﬂects a log-quadratic utility function, the elasticity of the marginal real revenue is
always minus unity: the permanent production is independent of inﬂation and always equals
the static monopoly output.
6 A quasilinear utility function of good y and numeraire good m underlying this inverse demand function
is
1
2α(lny)2 + β lny + γy + m,
which is log-quadratic in y if γ = 0. The utility is increasing and concave in y for (αlny +β)/y +γ > 0a n d
y ≥ e1−β/α.
7 As mentioned in the introduction, the condition that the elasticity of the marginal real revenue always
exceeds minus unity is also satisﬁed by all demand functions that have a constant price elasticity less than
minus unity.
75C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines how the permanent production varies with inﬂa t i o nw h e nt h e r ea r e
ﬁxed price- and quantity-adjustment costs, showing that it is determined by the elasticity of
the marginal real revenue. If the elasticity always exceeds minus unity, then output decreases
with inﬂation, whereas if the elasticity is always less than minus unity, then output increases
with inﬂation. In the special case that the elasticity always equals minus unity, then output
is independent of inﬂation. This is the case if demand is derived from a log-quadratic utility
function.
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